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Using a spatial autoregressive model, this paper highlights the issue of strategic interactions in 
the provision of public inputs, which is an important dimension of territorial competition within 
a developing economic integration area. The results of the estimations, carried out using the 
maximum likelihood method in panel data, show that the countries of the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA) are developing strategic behaviours in the 
supply of public inputs, particularly in the public infrastructure sector. Consequently, EMCCA 
countries need to be aware of the existence of this phenomenon in order to improve their public 
input supply strategies, and also to improve their positioning on the international market for the 
location of economic activities. 
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Economic integration zones are areas where the harmonisation of economic policies is 
very often the rule. But this harmonisation does not always exclude the idea of a real willingness 
for self-determination for governments. In fact, it can be observed that, in terms of 
infrastructure1, governments wishing to position their countries in the vast market for the 
location of economic activities tend to set their levels of infrastructure supply according to the 
levels of infrastructure development of neighbouring (competing) territories. This brings back 
to the forefront the phenomenon of strategic interactions which is a dimension of territorial 
competition and whose foundations can be found in the theory of fiscal federalism (Tiebout, 
1956, Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986, 1999; Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 
1995). 
According to the theory of fiscal federalism, strategic interactions between territories 
reflect a situation in which governments act in a non-cooperative manner, where each provokes 
or suffers, without intending to compete, the actions of its rivals (Brueckner, 2003; Leprince et 
al, 2005; Birkelöf, 2009; Costa et al, 2013; Ega, 2007) in terms of offering locational 
advantages. In other words, the territories behave like economic agents competing with each 
other to attract and retain tax bases, through differentiated and competitive offers of public 
inputs.  
Largely conducted at local level in a context of fiscal decentralisation, studies on the 
evaluation of the extent of strategic territorial interactions (Ermini and Santolini, 2010; Agostini 
et al, 2011; Foucault et al, 2008 ; Costa et al, 2013; Birkelöf, 2009; Yanquing, 2015; Hanes, 
2002) have also been the subject of research at national level, particularly within regional 
economic groupings (Bénassy-Quéré et al, 2007; Ega, 2007; McGarvey and Walter, 2004; 
Hamadou et al, 2014; Wang, 2018).  
The choice of an economic integration zone is revealing because it is still expected that 
the coordination of public policies in certain areas of economic activity could lead to the 
convergence of economies. However, the territories in question are very often heterogeneous 
in both structural and macroeconomic terms (Avom et al, 2015). In such a situation, by giving 
each territory the opportunity to accurately measure the level of relevance of its economic 
policy measures, territorial competition within an economic integration zone makes it possible 
to refine the order of priority of a territory in terms of the offer of locational advantages, based 
on its real level of potential. 
While a recent study (Mimboe and Fambon, 2019) was able to prove the existence of 
strategic fiscal interactions within the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, it 
must be said that no such assessment has yet been made in terms of infrastructure provision. 
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to analyse the extent of strategic interactions between 
countries of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA)2, particularly 
                                                             
1 In Marxist theory, infrastructure is the economic basis of a mode of production. According to Gianpiero (2009), 
it refers to : 
 public capital, in the sense that it is derived from investment expenditure and is characterized by long 
duration, technical indivisibility and a high capital-production ratio ; 
 public good, not necessarily in the sense that it belongs to the public sector but rather in the sense that it 
meets the criteria of non-exclusion and non-rivalry in consumption. 
2 CEMAC was born from the ashes of the former Central African Customs and Economic Union (CACEU) in 
1964, preceded by the Equatorial Customs Union (ECU) in 1959. With an estimated population of 51.8 million 
inhabitants and a GDP of around US$76.307 billion (WDI, 2017), it currently comprises six countries: Cameroon, 
Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, and Central African Republic. The variation in the rate of public 
investment from one state to another through the implementation of large-scale projects (transnational roads, 
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in the provision of public infrastructure. Presented as a prerequisite for economic development, 
public infrastructure has a positive impact on economic growth in general and private sector 
productivity in particular (Aschauer, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c). From the point of view of the New 
Economic Geography, investments in infrastructure are likely to promote regional development 
through effects on business location decisions and agglomeration economies (Fujita et al, 1999).  
In this study, we consider only four infrastructure sectors: water and sanitation, information 
and communication technology, electricity and transport. 
The rest of the article focuses on three main points. Section 2 presents some stylized facts 
on the state of infrastructure development in EMCCA. The empirical model and data are 
discussed in Section 3. The results are discussed in Section 4 before the conclusion (Section 5). 
 
2. Stylized facts 
In EMCCA as a whole, the level of infrastructural development is still low, beyond the 
differences observable from one country to another. 
2.1 Public investment and trends in infrastructure development 
2.1.1 Public investment in the EMCCA region 
Overall, public investment in sub-Saharan Africa is still lagging behind in terms of 
efficiency. The efficiency of public investment is an indicator for assessing the qualitative 
management of public investment. It refers not only to the existence but also to the use of the 
regulatory framework3. Studies show that the efficiency of public investment in sub-Saharan 
Africa is lower than in other regions of the world (IMF, 2018)4; at the level of classification by 
economic block, EMCCA scores the lowest (Table 1). 
    ‘Table1 here’ 
However, beyond this limited efficiency, two major phases of overall public investment can 
be distinguished in the EMCCA zone (Figure 1):  
    ‘Figure 1 here’ 
 1981-2003: public investment rates are essentially low, 3% of GDP on average. This 
period is characterised by a major event: the deterioration in the terms of trade that 
provoked the economic crisis of the second half of the 1980s, deprived countries of a 
large part of the foreign currency needed to finance their economies. This has 
considerably reduced the capacity for public investment. 
 
 2004-2013: it is considered as an expansion phase in terms of overall public investment. 
During this phase, public investment rates reach more than 8% of GDP. It should be 
remembered that most countries are gradually emerging from the constraints linked to 
external shocks and are devoting themselves more to the exploitation of their natural 
resources, particularly oil (Chad, Equatorial Guinea). This improvement will provide 
them with foreign currency and increase their investment capacity. 
                                                             
motorways, ports, hydroelectric dams, solar power plants, gas power plants, special economic zones, etc.) is aimed 
at increasing the stock of public capital with a view to improving the productivity of the private sector. 
3 i.e. budgetary rules, national and sectoral planning, coordination of administrations, management of public-
private partnerships, regulation of enterprises, multi-year budgeting, comprehensiveness of budgeting, budgetary 
cohesion, project evaluation and selection, investment protection, availability of financing and transparency of 
execution, project management and monitoring of assets (IMF, 2018). 
4 Sub-Saharan Africa ranks last after Latin America and the Caribbean and emerging or developing Asia. 
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2.1.2 Infrastructural development in EMCCA 
According to the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2018), Central Africa is the part 
of the continent where the level of infrastructural development is still low. It ranks last in the 
ranking after Northern Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa and East Africa. However, 
although still limited, the level of infrastructural development shows an overall increasing trend 
in Central Africa in general, and in the EMCCA region in particular. Figure 2 distinguishes 
between two major groups of countries in terms of infrastructure development in EMCCA: 
countries with a high level of infrastructure development (Gabon, Cameroon, and Equatorial 
Guinea) and countries with a low level of infrastructure development (Rep. of Congo, Central 
African Republic, Chad). From a sectoral point of view, the trends are asymmetrical. Four major 
infrastructure sectors have been identified : 
 Transport 
 Electricity 
 Information and communication technologies 
 Water and sanitation 
Of all these sectors, water and sanitation scores the highest in terms of infrastructure, 
followed by transport and electricity. Infrastructure development in information and 
communication technologies is still limited (Figure 3). However, the trends remain 
asymmetrical from one country to another. In terms of transport infrastructure, only Gabon 
achieves high scores (above the EMCCA average) between 2003 and 2018 (Figure 4). The 
situation is almost similar to that of electricity infrastructure, except in 2018, when Equatorial 
Guinea joins Gabon in the group of countries that score above the community average (Figure 
5).  
  ‘Figures 2, 3 & 4 here’ 
In the area of information and communication technologies, it is only from 2011 that 
EMCCA will begin a decisive turning point in its infrastructural development in the sector. 
Between 2012 and 2018, at least two countries score above the Community average (Figure 6). 
Finally, all countries score significantly higher in the water and sanitation infrastructure sector. 
However, only Gabon, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea score above the EMCCA average        
(Figure 7).  
 ‘Figure 6 & 7 here’ 
Among other peculiarities emanating from the above, there are a number of 
dissimilarities between countries, thus confirming a situation of discrepancies in the stock of 
public inputs that should also be analysed. 
2.2 Territorial dissimilarities and presumption of strategic interactions 
2.2.1 Territorial dissimilarities on the infrastructural level 
The different graphs presented above show that all EMCCA countries do not show the 
same intensity of activation of territorial resources. With regard to the dynamics of 
infrastructure supply, even if we distinguish two groups of countries in terms of infrastructure 
development, significant differences are perceptible within each group. The group whose 
performance is above the community average is made up of Gabon, Cameroon and Equatorial 
Guinea. However, among the latter, only Gabon achieved the best scores over the entire period, 
with the other two countries competing alternately for second place. Similarly, the group of 
countries whose performance is below the EMCCA average (Rep. of Congo, Central African 
 
5 
Republic, Chad) has performance gaps in infrastructure development. Chad, for example, 
shows the weakest performance over the entire period (Figure 2). Differences can also be 
observed at the sectoral level. The pace of development of transport, electricity, ICT and water 
and sanitation infrastructure shows different trends from one country to another. In terms of 
transport and electricity (Figures 4 and 5), for example, Gabon stands out considerably from 
the other countries, which in turn show significant levels of differentiation between them. This 
allows us to evoke a situation of presumption of strategic territorial interaction in terms of 
infrastructure supply. 
2.2.2 Presumption to strategic infrastructural interactions 
The strategic infrastructural interaction reflects a situation of territorial competition 
where the supply of public inputs of a given country is a function not only of its own socio-
economic realities, but also of the levels of supply of public inputs from neighboring countries. 
The confirmation of such a phenomenon essentially involves the estimation of a spatial 
autoregressive model which we shall subsequently carry out. But so far, the analysis of the 
graphical elements simply allows us to speak of a presumption of strategic infrastructural 
interaction. Indeed, in a context of economic integration, one would have expected the 
coordination of national economic policies to be operationalized. However, the discrepancies 
observed in the implementation of public investment policies and the resulting stocks of public 
inputs encourage the hypothesis of strategic territorial interactions around the infrastructure 
offer. Moreover, Figure 8 shows that from year to year, all countries tend to increase their stocks 
of public capital. 
 ‘Figure 8 here’ 
3. Empirical model 
3.1 Model specification 
The strategic infrastructural interactions discussed here are those observed between the 
central governments of EMCCA countries. In spatial econometrics, the analysis of such 
phenomena is generally done in several ways: either using a spatial autoregressive model with 
a lagged endogenous variable, or using a cross-regressive model with a lagged exogenous 
variable, the combination of the two making it possible to obtain the spatial Durbin model. 
Another way of analysing spatial interdependence is through the specification of a spatial 
process for errors.  
However, Gibbons and Overman (2012) show that spatial interaction is best understood 
through spatial shifts in the explanatory variables from neighbouring jurisdictions rather than 
through spatial shifts in the endogenous variable. However, in this study, as we do not have the 
data on exogenous variables that may be subject to spatial shifts in order to better understand 
the phenomenon of strategic infrastructural interactions between EMCCA countries, we will 
limit ourselves to the spatial autoregressive model with a shifted endogenous variable. 
Indeed, to speak of strategic infrastructural interaction is to say that the level of 
infrastructural development of a country i depends not only on its intrinsic socio-economic 
characteristics, but also, and more importantly, on the levels of infrastructural development of 
neighbouring competitor countries. In this situation, governments act in an uncooperative 
manner, where each provokes or suffers, without intending to compete, the actions of its rivals. 
In this respect, the infrastructural reaction function of a country i is given by the relationship 
(1). 
  𝐺𝑖𝑡 = Ri (𝐺−𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡)        (1)    
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Where 𝐺𝑖𝑡 represents the vector of public investment in infrastructure or simply the levels of 
infrastructural development from country i to period t;  𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡  the vector of other economic and 
socio-demographic characteristics (control variables) of country i at date t.  𝐺−𝑖𝑡 represents the 
vector of average rates of public investment or infrastructure development in neighbouring 
countries j (j ≠i) at date t; weighted by a matrix of spatial interactions W, we obtain the average 
weight of the rates of public investment or infrastructural development of the neighbouring 
countries;  𝐺−𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 𝐺𝑗𝑡 = 𝑊𝐺𝑗𝑡 and the equation (1), becomes: 𝑮𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝝀𝟐 ∑ 𝒘𝒊𝒋𝒏𝒊≠𝒋 𝑮𝒋𝒕 + 𝜷𝒌𝑿𝒌𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕           (2) 
Où 𝜆2 represents the spatial autoregressive parameter, i.e. the slope of the best infrastructure 
response function. The value and sign of 𝜆2 will indicate respectively the existence or not of 
strategic infrastructural interactions between EMCCA countries, and the meaning of these 
interactions; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the term of error. 
Estimation technique 
Since the rate of public investment in infrastructure in country i over a period depends 
on the level of public investment in territory j over the same period and vice versa, countries 
have reciprocal reaction functions. As a result, the term 𝑊𝐺𝑗𝑡  is endogenous to the model and 
correlated with the error term: 
E (𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑗𝑡) ≠ 0                              (3) 
In this case, the econometric consequences of the presence of spatial interactions are not 
only limited to the explained variable (spatial self-correlation), but also concern the random 
part of the model (spatial self-correlation of residuals).  
To avoid incorrect conclusions and to test separately the presence of the two spatial 
phenomena it is generally recommended to model explicitly the fact that the residuals can be 
linked between territorial authorities according to the following relationship: 𝜀𝑖𝑡= 𝜆𝑊𝜀𝑖𝑡  + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  (4) in matrix form, 𝜀 = 𝜆𝑊𝜀 + 𝜇  (5) 
With λ the coefficient of spatial self-correlation and μ white noise of the error term, assumed 
i.i.d. 5. 
The correlation between the errors and the levels of public investment in neighbouring 
territories implies that the estimation of the best infrastructure response functions cannot be 
carried out by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method and requires the use of methods capable 
of estimating models in which the explained variable depends at each point on its values at other 
points in space (spatial auto regression).  
To obtain efficient and unbiased estimators, estimation techniques such as the maximum 
likelihood method, the instrumental variable technique (Cliff and Ord, 1973; Anselin, 1988; 
Kelejian and Robinson, 1993; Kelejian and Prucha, 1998), the generalized method of moments 
and the generalized double least squares method (Kelejian and Prucha, 1999, 2006) are more 
appropriate. It should be noted, however, that some of them, notably double least squares, 
instrumental variables and generalised moments, have been the subject of much criticism 
(Gibbons and Overman, 2012) to the point where Lyytikäinen (2012) establishes that these 
standard methods tend to overestimate the degree of territorial interdependence. In this study, 
we will use the maximum likelihood method, which has not only been less criticised but also 
                                                             
5 Independent and identically distributed 
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inspired a number of authors in this respect, Case et al (1993), Besley and Case (1995), 
Brueckner (2003), Ega (2007), Foucault et al (2008), among others. 
 
Spatial specifications  
As a reminder, the modelling of spatial interaction involves the construction of a spatial 
interaction matrix W. It is a square matrix with as many rows as columns as there are 
geographical areas. This construction is generally done according to several criteria (Hamadou 
et al, 2014). However, within the framework of this study, taking into account the significance 
of the results and the availability of data, four types of constructions were selected: two weight 
matrices developed according to the economic criterion (GDP and GDP per capita), a weight 
matrix obtained by calculating distances and a contiguity matrix. 
The Bird's-eye View Distance Matrix (WD) 
According to the distance criterion, it is assumed that the intensity of interdependence 
between two countries i and j depends on the distance between the centroids of these countries 
(here the different capitals). Thus the matrix WD is a matrix such as, 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑑   ={ 1𝑑𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑓𝑖 ≠ 𝑗0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                          
 (6)       
According to NIC estimates 6, dij represents the distance as the crow flies. 
 
The contiguity matrix (WC) 
The contiguity matrix WC is a matrix such as, 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑐   ={1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒        (7) 
 
The economic criterion based on GDP (WGDP) 
The construction of this matrix is based on the average GDP of each country between 
1981 and 2013 for overall public investment and between 2003 and 2013 for infrastructure 
development. Thus, WGDP is a matrix such as, 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑑𝑝  = 1|𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖−𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗| ∑ 1|𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖−𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗|⁄         (8) 
 
The economic criterion based on GDP per capita (WGDPPC) 
The matrix WGDPPC is constructed on the basis of the average GDP per capita of each 
EMCCA country between 1981 and 2013 for overall public investment; then between 2003 and 
2013 for infrastructural development as, 
                                                             
6 National Institute of Cartography (Cameroon)) 
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𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐  = 1|𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖−𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑗| ∑ 1|𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖−𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑗|⁄                    (9) 
For reasons of simplification, these different matrices will be represented as follows: 
WPIB = W1; WPIBPT = W2; WD = W3; WC = W4                 (10) 
 
3.2 Nature and sources of data  
The data used in this study are panel data. These data have the advantage of providing 
a wide range of information on several points in space. This increases the degrees of freedom 
while reducing the effect of collinearity between the explanatory variables, in order to make 
efficient estimates. 
These data cover the six countries of the EMCCA space for a period from 1981 to 2013 
for public investments, and from 2003 to 2013 for levels of infrastructure development. The 
data on public investment in infrastructure are taken from the Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS) of the International Monetary Fund services. The data on infrastructure development in 
the different countries come from the African Development Bank (ADB, 2018), while the WDI 
database (2017) provides data on economic and socio-demographic control variables. 
3.3 Description of variables 
     3.3.1 The dependent variable (𝑮𝒊𝒕) 
The variable of interest consists mainly of data on levels of infrastructure development 
grouped into four main sectors in addition to overall public investment. These include: 
 Global public investment (INVPUB) of each EMCCA country (as a percentage of GDP) 
 Transport Composite Index (TCI) : total roads paved (Km per 10,000 inhabitants), total 
road network in Km (per Km2 of exploitable land area) 
 Electricity Index (EI) : net generation (Kwh per inhabitant) 
 ICT Composite Index (ICTCI) : total phone subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants), number 
of internet users (per 100 inhabitants), fixed (wired) broadband internet subscribers (per 
100 inhabitants), international internet bandwidth (Mbps) 
 Water and Sanitation Composite Index (WSCI) : improved water source (% of population 
with access), improved sanitation facilities(% of population with access) 
3.3.2 Independent variables (𝑾𝑮𝒋𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑿𝒌𝒊𝒕)  
The lagged endogenous variable (𝑾𝑮𝒋𝒕) 
It is the average of the infrastructural development levels of neighbouring countries (j) 
(j≠i), for the four infrastructural sectors 
Economic and demographic variables (∑ 𝑿𝒌𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒌=𝟏 ) 
- The size of the market captured by the GDP of each EMCCA country, and expressed in current 
US dollars (GDP) (in logarithm and difference of order 3). 
- The total population (POP), which measures the demographic weight of each country (and 
makes it possible to capture the potential size of the market in another way) (in logarithm and 
second difference). 
- GDP per capita expressed in current US dollars (GDPPT), which is equal to GDP/POP (in 





- The global public investment of each country expressed as a percentage of GDP (GPINV) 
(first difference). 
- Population density (DENSPOP): the number of inhabitants per square kilometer (in logarithm 
and second difference). 
 
4. Analysis of the results 
A country's infrastructural development depends largely on its level of public investment. 
In this respect, the intensity of the strategic interactions around this variable was analysed first, 
before looking specifically at the situation in the different infrastructure sectors. The results of 
the estimates are summarised in Table 2. The full results can be found in the annex. 
 
 The global public investment 
The results obtained with the different weighting matrices W1, W2, W3 and W4, 
confirm the presence of strategic interactions on overall public investment in EMCCA. With a 
statistical significance rate of 5%, the value of the autoregressive spatial parameter obtained 
with the weighting matrix W1 shows that each EMCCA country tends to increase (decrease) 
global public investment by 0.21% in response to a 1% increase (decrease) in neighbouring 
countries. Thus, from the point of view of macroeconomic characteristics in terms of GDP, each 
country works to improve its public capital by competitively increasing the level of public 
investment. On the other hand, in terms of GDP per capita (matrix of weight W2), it is rather 
observed that each country tends to reduce (increase) its overall public investment rate by 
0.38% following an increase (reduction) of 1% in neighbouring countries. This simply means 
that the share of public investment aimed at improving the standard of living of inhabitants can 
be strategically reduced under the assumption that individuals can benefit from neighbourhood 
effects. 
In terms of the characteristics related to distance (matrix of weight W3) and contiguity 
(matrix of weight W4), in each country there will be trends of reductions (increase) in public 
investment rates of about 0.60% and 0.34% respectively, in response to an increase (reduction) 
of 1% in neighbouring countries. Indeed, from the point of view of the physical connectivity of 
territories, the realisation of public investments in certain countries can lead to situations of 
positive externalities for a given country. From this perspective, some countries may, at a given 
time, consider it inappropriate to increase their levels of public investment and benefit from 
neighbourhood effects.  
By way of illustration, the construction of a transnational road or any other type of 
infrastructure with cross-border implications may lead a State to limit its level of public 
investment in this sector in order to take advantage of investments made by neighbouring 
countries, for the transport of its export products for example.  
The analysis of the phenomenon of strategic interactions around public investment 
certainly reveals trends in the degree of strategic infrastructural interactions between EMCCA 
countries, but an appreciation of the phenomenon by infrastructure sector provides a fairly 





Transport sector  
The phenomenon of strategic infrastructural interactions is analysed through an index 
called Transport Composite Index (TCI). 
The values taken by the spatial autoregressive parameter in the transport sector are all 
different from zero. This is a proof of the existence of strategic infrastructural interactions 
between the countries of the EMCCA space. The degree of statistical significance of the results 
is 1% for the weight matrices W2 and W3, and 10% for the matrices W1 and W4. With the 
matrices of weight W2 and W3, the autoregressive spatial parameter displays values of -1.434 
and -1.714 respectively. For the first case, each EMCCA country will reduce (increase) its level 
of infrastructure development in the transport sector by 1.43% in response to a 1% increase 
(reduction) in neighbouring countries. The reduction (increase) will be 1.71% for the second 
case. In terms of explanations, we can mention the neighbourhood effects generated by the 
construction of transport infrastructure within a Community area. Indeed, the level of 
development of transport infrastructure in some countries is likely to have positive 
repercussions on another country, which will find it rationally advisable to strategically limit 
its public investment in this sector, in order to take advantage instead of the positive 
externalities arising from the efforts of other countries. Cameroon and Congo, for example, 
have joined forces to build the transnational road Sangmélima-Ouesso (700 km). However, it 
must be noted that the Congolese part of the project has been completed, while Cameroon is 
still lagging behind in finalising the 322 km section for which it is responsible. One can read 
there a purely strategic behaviour, which in reality obliges Cameroon to prioritize at a given 
time the development of other infrastructure sectors rather than the construction of transnational 
roads. It is very clear that coordination does not seem to be taking over in the pace of 
operationalisation of projects with a community vocation, in a perspective of sub-regional 
economic integration.  
 
Electricity sector  
In this sector, the phenomenon of strategic infrastructural interaction is analysed by 
means of Electricity Index (EI); and at this level, the autoregressive spatial parameter shows a 
value of -3.027 with the W2 matrix, for a statistical significance rate of 1%. This result shows 
that each CEMAC country tends to reduce (increase) its investments in the electricity sector by 
3.03% in response to a 1% increase in neighbouring countries. It should also be recalled that 
during this period, many of these countries have not yet recovered from the consequences of 
the economic crisis of the 1980s, which considerably reduced their public investment capacities. 
 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) 
The assessment indicator here is ICT Composite Index (ICTCI). In this sector, the 
slopes of the infrastructural reaction functions are all positive. The results are statistically 
significant at 1%. For the matrix of weight W1, the autoregressive spatial parameter shows 
0.682, to say that each CEMAC country will increase (decrease) its investments in the ICT 
sector by 0.68% in response to an increase (decrease) of 1% in neighbouring countries. 
Considering the weight matrices W2, W3 and W4, the increases (reductions) will be 0.54%, 
0.80% and 0.90% respectively. Thus, in view of the major role of ICTs in the process of 
activating territorial resources, each country tends to strategically increase its level of 




Water and Sanitation sector 
Based on the Water and Sanitation Composite Index (WSCI), it comes that, on the 
whole, the autoregressive spatial parameter is different from zero. This proves that the EMCCA 
countries are in a situation of strategic interactions with regard to the construction of 
infrastructures in the water and sanitation sector.  
The results obtained with the W3 weighting matrix show that each EMCCA country 
will increase (decrease) infrastructure supply by 0.93% in response to a 1% increase (decrease) 
in neighbouring countries. In fact, the weight matrix in question is constructed from the 
distances between the capitals of each country. However, these capitals are also major centres 
of agglomeration of economic activities which develop reciprocal influences between them. 
Thus, the level of infrastructural development in a given capital is linked to the infrastructural 
advances made by neighbouring capitals. In this sense, any positive change in public investment 




Observation of the results of the estimates made by the Maximum Likelihood Panel 
method shows that the EMCCA countries are developing strategic interactions among 
themselves in terms of offering locational advantages. These strategic interdependencies are 
first observed at the level of overall public investment, then at the level of the different 
infrastructure sectors. It has been observed that each country undertakes public policy actions 
not without taking into account the actions undertaken by neighbouring countries; but the nature 
and extent of the interactions vary according to the different weighting matrices considered. 
This gives rise to particular interpretations depending on the case.  
As far as economic policy implications are concerned, EMCCA countries will have to 
become aware of the existence of such a phenomenon in order not only to perfect their public 
inputs supply strategies, but also to improve their positioning on the international market for 
locating economic activities. In fact, while at the local level inter-jurisdictional competition is 
likely to improve the adequacy of the supply of public goods and services to the preferences of 
the population (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972), territorial competition within an economic 
integration zone in terms of the supply of public inputs is aimed at matching the infrastructure 
supply to the socio-economic forces and opportunities that each territory must take advantage 
of. Secondly, while it is likely to stimulate the search for efficiency by local governments 
(Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995) at the local level, it appears that, at the sub-regional 
level, territorial competition is likely to improve the strategic positioning of each country in the 
vast market for the location of economic activities. In this respect, each country should have 
national centers for strategic infrastructure and marketing monitoring, in order to refine the 
order of priority of public interventions in the field of infrastructure supply, with a view to a 








Table 1. Average public investment efficiency score by economic block  
Economic blocks Physical infrastructure High quality 
infrastructure 
Hybrid indicator 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.460 0.803 0.642 
EMCCA 0.305 0.625 0.511 
EAC 0.487 0.874 0.735 
WAEMU 0.369 0.814 0.619 
 
Note: EMCCA = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; EAC = East African Community; WAEMU = West 
African Economic and Monetary Union 
Source : FMI (2018). 
 
Figure 1. EMCCA: change in the overall public investment rate between 1981 and 2013 
 
           
            Source: Author, IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) data (2017) 
Figure 2. EMCCA: change in the infrastructure development index between 2003 and 
2018 
 
Note: GAB = Gabon; CAM = Cameroon; EG = Equatorial Guinea; CON = Rep. of Congo; CAR = Central African Republic; 
CHD = Chad; EMCCA AV = EMCCA Average; AIDI = Africa Infrastructure Development Index. 
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Figure 3. EMCCA: average level of infrastructure development by sector, 2003-2018 
 
 
Note : EMCCA AV = EMCCA Average; ICT = Information and Communication Technologies 
Source : Author, AfDB data (2018) 
 
Figure 4. EMCCA: state of transport infrastructure between 2003 and 2018 
 
Note: GAB = Gabon; CAM = Cameroon; EG = Equatorial Guinea; CON = Rep. of Congo; CAR = Central African Republic; 
CHD = Chad; EMCCA AV = EMCCA Average; TCI = Transport Composite Index. 
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Figure 5. EMCCA : level of development of electricity infrastructure between 2003 and 
2018 
 
Note: GAB = Gabon; CAM = Cameroon; EG = Equatorial Guinea; CON = Rep. of Congo; CAR = Central African Republic; 
CHD = Chad; EMCCA AV = EMCCA Average; ECI = Electricity Composite Index 
Source: Author, AfDB data (2018) 
Figure 6. EMCCA: level of ICT infrastructure development between 2003 and 2018 
 
Note: GAB = Gabon; CAM = Cameroon; EG = Equatorial Guinea; CON = Rep. of Congo; CAR = Central African Republic; 
CHD = Chad; EMCCA AV = EMCCA Average; ICTCI = ICT Composite Index 
Source: Author, AfDB data (2018) 
Figure 7. EMCCA: level of development of infrastructure in the water and sanitation 
sector 
 
Note: GAB = Gabon; CAM = Cameroon; EG = Equatorial Guinea; CON = Rep. of Congo; CAR = Central African Republic; CHD = Chad; 
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Source: Author, AfDB data (2018) 
 
Figure 8. EMCCA: level of infrastructural development by country, 2003-2018 
 
 
Note: GAB = Gabon; CAM = Cameroon; EG = Equatorial Guinea; CON = Rep. of Congo; CAR = Central African Republic; 
CHD = Chad; AIDI = Africa Infrastructure Development Index. 
Source: Author, AfDB data (2018) 
 
 
Table 2. Results of estimates of equation (2) using the maximum likelihood technique 
Dependent 
variable 
Value of the spatial autoregressive parameter (𝝀𝟐)  
according to the different weight matrices 









































*p<0.1 ; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note : TCI = transport composite index ; EI = electricity index ; ICTCI = ICT composite index ; WSCI = water and sanitation 
composite index ; GPINV = global public investment; W1 et W2 = weight matrices constructed on the basis of economic 
criteria (GDP and GDPPC) ; W3 et W4 = weight matrices constructed on the basis of the criteria of distance as the crow flies 
and contiguity. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
 




198 3.531394 3.243296 .1105 25.11 
GDP 198 6.17e+09 6.76e+09 3.67e+07 3.23e+10 
GDP per capita 
(GDPPC) 
198 2389.432 4050.315 136.0106 22742.38 




198 12.94691 10.90598 2.901335 45.81184 
 










66 2.685061 1.038232 .915 4.536 
Electricity 
index (EI) 
66 5.134848 7.461392 .054 23.271 
ICT composite 
index (ICTCI) 





66 46.93411 14.28346 18.098 61.373 
Source: Author, data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2018), the African Development Bank (AfDB, 
2018), and the World Bank (WDI, 2017). 
Table 4. Estimation results 




W1 W2 W3 W4 
 








DlnGDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Obs. 198 198 198 198 
 



























































Obs. 66 66 66 66 
 
























D2lnDENSPOP -0.014 -0.279 -0.091 0.157 
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20.477 32.129 13.729 
(2.69)*** 













Obs. 66 66 66 66 
 
































































Obs. 66 66 66 66 
 








































_cons 49.167 10.743 7.656 18.509 
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(3.56)*** (0.80) (1.30) (0.79) 











Obs. 66 66 66 66 
*p<0.1 ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note: DlnGDP = logarithm of gross domestic product in first difference; DlnGDPPC = logarithm of gross 
domestic product per capita in first difference; D2lnPOP = logarithm of population in second difference; 
D2lnDENSPOP = logarithm of population density in second difference. 
Source: Author 
 
 
